

Remuneration Report for the members of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board of Österreichische Post AG (Austrian Post) for the financial year 2024

Dear shareholders!

Österreichische Post AG (Austrian Post) has been publicly traded on the Vienna Stock Exchange since May 2006. The Company fulfils all principles of responsible business management in line with good corporate governance, which is oriented to the sustainable creation of value and transparency towards shareholders and other stakeholders.

With this Remuneration Report, we implement the requirements of Sections 78c and 98a AktG and provide a comprehensive overview of the remuneration awarded or due to the Management Board and Supervisory Board Members in 2024. The Remuneration Report was prepared by the Management Board and the Supervisory Board and is to be submitted to the Annual General Meeting on 9 April 2025.

This Remuneration Report is based on the Remuneration Policy adopted by the Annual General Meeting on 18 April 2024. Last year's revision focussed on anchoring ESG targets and a stronger long-term orientation in the variable remuneration. In addition, there were selective adjustments regarding the definition of the financial target criteria and their weighting, the target achievement corridors and the maximum remuneration.

The Remuneration Report of Österreichische Post describes in detail and in a comprehensible manner the remuneration logic and accounting for the year 2024. On the one hand, we want to explain the main features of the Remuneration Policy of Österreichische Post, in particular the three-pillar model with one fixed and two variable salary components, and on the other hand, we will present the remuneration for the 2024 financial year. The system of the revised 2024 Remuneration Policy is applied in the fixed and short-term variable Management Board remuneration for 2024. The long-term variable remuneration component, whose three-year performance period ended on 31 December 2024, is based on the parameters of the 2020 Remuneration Policy that were valid at the start of the programme on 1 January 2022.

In addition to the legal requirements, we are guided by the requirements of the Austrian Corporate Governance Code. Furthermore, we take into account the trends of the capital market regarding remuneration, because as a listed company we feel obliged to all shareholders and stakeholders and want to be open and transparent. It has always been our concern to create a performance-oriented bonus system with a high proportion of variable remuneration components. This report provides our investors with transparency and accountability for the remuneration of the Management Board and Supervisory Board.

Elisabeth Stadler m.p.
Chair of the Supervisory Board

Walter Oblin m.p.
Chair of the Management Board

1. Introduction

This Remuneration Report describes the basic features of the remuneration systems for the members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board of Österreichische Post and provides information on the remuneration awarded and due to the members of the Management Board as well as the remuneration of the Supervisory Board in the 2024 financial year. It takes into account the requirements set out in Sections 78c and 98a AktG and is based on Statement 37 of the Austrian Financial Reporting and Auditing Committee ("AFRAC Statement").

The Remuneration Policy and the Remuneration Report were reviewed by the Remuneration Committee of Österreichische Post and approved by the Supervisory Board at its meeting held on 6 March 2025. In accordance with corporate law requirements, the Remuneration Report will be presented for resolution at the Annual General Meeting on 9 April 2025. Last year's Remuneration Report for the members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board was approved at the Annual General Meeting on 18 April 2024 with a majority of 89.5%, and the new Remuneration Policy was approved with a majority of 99.1 %.

Economic development in the past financial year

In 2024, Österreichische Post was confronted with challenging economic conditions. High inflation and the simultaneous decline in economic performance had a negative impact on the investment behaviour of consumers and companies. Demand in retail segments was particularly affected by this difficult market environment. This development also affected Österreichische Post's customers in the mail order and advertising sectors. Like all companies, Österreichische Post is required to work on both revenue and expenses in order to maintain the stability of its business.

Against this backdrop, revenue growth of 13.9% to EUR 3,123.1m in 2024 was very satisfactory. The Parcel & Logistics Division generated revenue growth of 20.9% to EUR 1,712.5m with its business in Türkiye, based on volume growth in all regions of Österreichische Post. Excluding Parcel Türkiye, the division generated revenue growth of 12.7% in 2024. Business development in Türkiye continues to be characterised by high inflation and volatile exchange rate developments.

The Mail Division recorded a 4.1% increase in revenue to EUR 1,239.8m in 2024. A further decline in the traditional letter mail business was offset by positive impulses from elections and tariff effects. The Retail & Bank Division generated strong revenue growth of 19.5% to EUR 201.5m due to the improved interest rate environment for banks.

Despite the challenges posed by inflation and the related increase in energy, material and staff costs, Österreichische Post recorded an improvement in its key earnings indicators in 2024. EBITDA increased by 8.0% to EUR 422.7m and earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) rose by 9.0% to EUR 207.3m.

Earnings per share in 2024 amounted to EUR 2.04 after EUR 1.96 in the previous year. Based on the good result, strong cash flow and the solid balance sheet, a dividend of EUR 1.83 per share will therefore be proposed to the Annual General Meeting on 9 April 2025. This continues to be based on maintaining a predictable dividend policy. Since its IPO in 2006, Österreichische Post has pursued the goal of distributing a dividend of at least 75% of the Group net profit.

2. Basic features of the Remuneration Policy for the Management Board

The current remuneration system for the Management Board members was approved at the Annual General Meeting held on 9 April 2024.

The remuneration system for the Management Board is designed to create incentives for the Management Board members to actively pursue the Group strategy and ensure a sustainable positive development of the Company. These efforts are promoted through the design of the remuneration components and in particular through the setting of criteria for variable remuneration in line with the Company's integrated corporate and sustainability strategy.

The following principles apply to the remuneration of the Management Board:

- Implementation of the Group strategy: The specification of the performance criteria must be in line with the Group's business strategy. The targets thus take into account the strategy, the business model and the positioning of the Company.
- Linking remuneration and performance: The variable performance-based component should have a disproportionate share of the total remuneration and include ambitious targets in the performance criteria.
- Variable remuneration aims at sustainability of performance and shareholder interests: A significant portion of the variable remuneration should take into account long-term performance and reflect the development of the Post share as well as non-financial indicators and components.


Structure of the remuneration for the Management Board

The remuneration of the Management Board includes fixed and variable salary components. The variable remuneration is divided into two components and consists of an annual bonus (Short-Term Incentive, STI) and a long-term variable remuneration (Long-Term Incentive, LTI). These variable components are linked to performance and dependent on the achievement of financial and non-financial performance criteria derived from the strategic goals and operational management of the Company.

The majority of the remuneration of the Management Board members is made up of the variable, performance-based remuneration components, the amount of which is determined by the performance of the Management Board members and the success of the Company. At the beginning of each financial year, the remuneration committee sets target values for all performance criteria of the variable remuneration, the degree of achievement of which determines the amount of the actual payment.

When setting the target values and the lower and upper thresholds, the Remuneration Committee ensures that they are adequate and ambitious. If the targets are not met, the variable compensation can drop to zero. If the targets are significantly exceeded, the achievement of the targets is limited because threshold values are set. Furthermore, the Management Board remuneration is subject to a malus and clawback regulation, which under certain conditions (financial situation of the company, miscalculations, misconduct) can result in a reduction of STI and LTI remuneration that has not yet been paid out or a clawback of STI and LTI remuneration that has already been paid out.

Remuneration system for the Management Board of Österreichische Post



Fixed remuneration

The fixed basic salary takes into account the range of the duties and responsibilities of the respective Management Board member as well as the duration of the term of office on the Management Board. Furthermore, the basic salary is based on the salary structure of publicly listed Austrian companies and comparable international publicly listed companies. For this purpose, a benchmark covering the 20 ATX companies in Austria, the 50 medium-sized comparable MDAX companies in Germany as well as a further 15 European logistics companies is also taken into account.

In addition to the fixed basic salary, the fixed remuneration also includes benefits in kind, various types of insurance coverage and pension fund contributions.

Variable remuneration

The variable remuneration consists of two elements: the Short-Term Incentive with a one-year performance period as well as the Long-Term Incentive with a three-year performance period and a four-year holding period for the personal investment. The combination of a short-term and long-term observation period creates an incentive in business management to achieve a balanced relationship between short-term and long-term interests.

The targets for the variable remuneration components agreed upon with the Management Board members are consistent with the Group strategy, sustainable corporate development and the interests of all stakeholders. For this reason, the performance criteria consist of both financial and non-financial aspects.

ESG targets are embedded in both the STI and the LTI and are selected annually from the Post ESG criteria catalogue. The Post ESG criteria catalogue is derived from the 2030 Sustainability Master Plan, which defines goals and measures from the three strategic areas of sustainability "Economy & Customers", "Environment & Climate" and "People & Social". The chart below shows the current Post ESG criteria catalogue, which may be amended depending on future strategic prioritisation.

Post ESG Criteria Catalogue

Economy & Customers	Environment & Climate	People & Social
Customer Satisfaction	Climate Change - CO ₂ Emissions and Adaptation Measures	Corporate Culture
Quality of Service	Resource Consumption	Occupational Safety
Reliability of Supply	Energy Efficiency	Occupational Health
Sustainable Procurement / Supply Chain	Electric Vehicles	Data Protection and Data Security
Human Rights	Non-Fossil Fuels	Employee Satisfaction
Reporting and ESG Ratings	Renewable Energies (PV Systems, Wind Power)	Diversity and Inclusion
Governance and Compliance	Recycling and Environmental Management	Employer Attractiveness (Recommendation)
Increase in Value and Innovations of the Company	Circular Economy	Social Engagement

Short-Term Incentive (STI) Programme

The STI is designed to reward performance in the past financial year in line with the short-term development of the Company. At the beginning of each financial year, target values are defined for the two key financial performance indicators of Österreichische Post, namely "revenue" and "EBIT" (earnings before interest and tax) and optionally for a third financial metric. After the financial year has come to a close, the Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board determines the

specific target achievement value for the two indicators of revenue and EBIT on the basis of the audited consolidated annual financial statements.

The financial targets can vary in their degree of achievement between 0% and 150%, whereby thresholds are defined for the two indicators revenue and EBIT at a target achievement of 50%.


A modifier is to be applied to the financial target achievement, which can influence the level of target achievement by a maximum of +/- 20%. The actual amount of the bandwidth is defined for each financial year as part of the definition of the target criteria. The modifier establishes the direct reference to strategic initiatives as well as to the sustainability strategy and the ESG indicators. The Remuneration Committee annually defines focal points on the aspects of Economy & Customers, Environment & Climate and People & Social, which are derived from Österreichische Post's current subject areas and defined in the Post ESG criteria catalogue.

The assessment of the implementation of the focal points specified in the STI modifier results from the assessment by the Remuneration Committee, which is summarised and documented in a report. The modifier is 1.0 for 100% target achievement and shall be set differently if the performance in the described aspects exceeds or falls short of expectations.

The STI payout amount is calculated using the contractually defined target value. The specific STI payout amount is derived from the percentage calculated taking into account the target achievement of the financial parameters and the determination of the modifier. The STI pays out a maximum of 150% of the target value.

The following chart provides an overview of the STI.

Presentation of the Short-Term Incentive Programme of Österreichische Post



Long-Term Incentive (LTI) Programme

The LTI is intended to reward the long-term sustainable performance of the Management Board members and also to ensure alignment with the interests of the shareholders in a positive development of the share price. The methodology of this programme strengthens this objective through a required personal investment of the Management Board members in shares of the Company, through the long level of retention and the positive share price relation from the start to the end of the programme after three years.

The starting point for the LTI are Performance Share Units (PSU), which are calculated via the contractually defined target value divided by the start reference share price. The target value is contractually set individually for each Management Board Member.

The incentive in the form of the final number of PSU is calculated by multiplying the number of PSU at the beginning of the programme by the degree of target achievement, which can range from 0% to 200%. The final reference share price at the end of the three-year performance period, plus the dividend per share paid during the performance period, is used to

determine the payout amount. The LTI payout amount is in any case capped at 200% of the contractually defined target value.

The target criteria used for the LTI include two to three financial targets and since 2024 one ESG target. The financial target criteria each weighted at 15-40 %, are as follows: Earnings per share as net earnings and basis for the dividend policy and operating free cash flow as basis for the ability to pay dividends. As a third target the relative total shareholder return (e.g. EURO STOXX Total Market Industrial Transportation index) or a strategic target (e.g. market share) can be used. The ESG target, weighted at 20-33 %, consists of a maximum of three topics from the Post ESG criteria catalogue, which are defined annually by the Remuneration Committee for the respective LTI programme.

For the LTI 2022-2024 attributable to the reporting year 2024 – described in Chapter 3.3 – the 2020 Remuneration Policy applies. The target criteria used accordingly are each weighted at one-third and include the following control parameters: earnings per share, free cash flow, and relative total shareholder return (TSR). The consideration of ESG criteria in the long-term variable remuneration component has been implemented with the new remuneration logic since 2024.

The 100% target values as well as the threshold and maximum values for the criteria are determined by the Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board at the beginning of the programme and take into account the medium-term planning and, if applicable, special effects and the historical development of performance indicators as well as current market developments. The maximum target achievement for the performance indicators is set at 200% of the target value.

After the end of the three-year performance period, the auditor confirms the achievement of the targets following the approval of the consolidated results of Österreichische Post. Based on this target achievement, the degree of target achievement and the LTI payout amount are determined by the Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board. For the LTI, the maximum amount to be paid out is limited to 200% of the defined target value.

The following chart provides an overview of the LTI. This system applies to all current programmes since 2024.

Presentation of the Long-Term Incentive Programme of Österreichische Post



3. Remuneration of the Management Board 2024

This chapter describes the concrete application of the remuneration system for the members of the Management Board of Österreichische Post in the 2024 financial year. It contains detailed information on the total remuneration of the Management Board, the target setting and target achievement of the variable remuneration, as well as information on the remuneration of the individual Management Board members for the 2024 financial year.

In the following, both the remuneration awarded and the remuneration due to the Management Board members are presented. The **remuneration due** includes the amounts actually paid to the Management Board member within a specified period which are to be assigned to the current period under review. On the other hand, it also includes entitlements definitively acquired in this period, even if payment takes place in a later period. The **remuneration awarded** relates to provisions allocated in a financial year as well as other accrued remuneration components made on the basis of legal or contractual obligations which must be economically allocated in this reporting period although the final specification and payment will take place in subsequent periods. With the exception of the information presented in chapter 3.4 "Remuneration awarded from current LTI programmes", all tables include remuneration components due, i.e. amounts actually received or entitlements definitively acquired. This allows for a good comparability of the annual remunerations.

The only members of the Management Board of Österreichische Post in the 2024 financial year were Georg Pölzl, Walter Oblin and Peter Umundum. Georg Pölzl stepped down from Austrian Post's Management Board as planned on 30 September 2024 after his contract expired and took his retirement. In the following section, the type and amount of the individual remuneration components for every Management Board member will be presented along with a subsequent synopsis.

3.1 Fixed remuneration

The fixed remuneration of the Management Board members 2024 consisted of the fixed basic salary, benefits in kind, various insurance policies and pension fund contributions.

Benefits in kind include the provision of a car for official and private purposes, including driver, as well as the reimbursement of the costs of a telephone connection/mobile phone intended for business and private purposes.

The benefits of an accident insurance policy are also listed, which provides additional insurance coverage in the event of death and in case of invalidity, whether they are on-duty or off-duty. Furthermore, there is the possibility of participating in a management group health insurance scheme.

All members of the Management Board are entitled to contributions made by the Company to a voluntary pension fund concluded with APK Pensionskasse AG. The pension fund contributions are set at 10% of the fixed basic salary.

Fixed remuneration

EUR	Georg Pölzl	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum
Fixed basic salary	524,860 ¹	548,571	478,571
Benefits in kind	9,236	10,765	12,894
Group health insurance	2,863	-	1,547
Accident insurance	3,947	2,984	2,695
Pension fund contribution	56,375	56,229	49,054
TOTAL FIXED REMUNERATION	597,281	618,549	544,761

¹ Retired as of 30 September 2024 - therefore pro-rata share of remuneration

In addition to the above-mentioned insurance policies, the members of the Management Board of Österreichische Post are also insured within the context of a Directors and Officers Liability Insurance (D&O). The insurance provides judicial and extrajudicial protection against unfounded claims for damages as well as the settlement of claims considered to be legally justified.

3.2 Short-term variable remuneration 2024 (STI 2024)

This chapter describes the entitlements acquired in 2024 based on the STI agreement concluded at the beginning of 2024. The evaluation of the relevant performance criteria has been carried out by the Remuneration Committee at the beginning of the year 2025 on the basis of the audited annual financial statements and consolidated financial statements. The payment of the entitlements will be made at a later date. The amounts paid out in 2024 from the STI agreement 2023 are shown in the general overview.

In accordance with the Remuneration Policy approved by the 2024 Annual General Meeting, the financial criteria "revenue" (weighted at 40%) and "EBIT" (weighted at 60%) and also non-financial criteria in the form of a modifier of a maximum of +/-20% are used for the assessment of the short-term variable remuneration. For 2024, the Remuneration Committee has set the modifier as a multiplier in the range of 0.8 to 1.2 (+/-20%).

Weighting of the criteria

Area	Criteria	Weighting
Financial targets	Revenue	40%
	EBIT (before special effects)	60%
Modifier	A value between 0.8 and 1.2 is defined at the discretion of the Remuneration Committee on the basis of a pre-defined catalogue.	+/-20% multiplier ¹

¹ For the STI 2024, a multiplier of +/-20% was set within the given framework of the Remuneration Policy

The following table shows the values set by the Remuneration Committee at the beginning of 2024 for the financial target criteria "revenue" and "EBIT" at 50%, 100% and 150% target achievement. The target criteria are based on the plan values for 2024 approved by the Supervisory Board. There were no adjustments to the financial criteria during the year.

After the submission of the annual financial statements and consolidated financial statements and confirmation by the auditor, the Remuneration Committee evaluated the level of target achievement. Österreichische Post generated revenue of EUR 3,123.1m and reported EBIT of EUR 207.3m. Both financial criteria show an overachievement of the target. The target achievement for the financial criteria is 142.7%.

Target achievement of the criteria

EUR m	50% target	100% target	150% target	Actual value	Target achievement	Weighted target achievement
Revenue	2,794	2,914	3,034	3,123	150.0%	60.0%
EBIT	144	180	216	207	137.9%	82.7%
ACHIEVEMENT OF FINANCIAL TARGETS						142.7%

In addition to the financial criteria "revenue" and "EBIT", the modifier significantly determines the overall target achievement of the Short-Term Incentive. For the 2024 financial year, a catalogue of criteria was defined by the Remuneration Committee, which takes into account the strategic priorities and in particular the ESG indicators. More than 50% of the indicators follow the objectives of the topics defined in Österreichische Post's "Sustainability Master Plan". The modifier was defined in a range of 0.8 to 1.2 in 2024, as well as associated target achievement indicators. Thus, the overall degree of target achievement can be influenced by +/-20%. The criteria defined for the modifier and their target achievement are described below.

- Aras Kargo: Österreichische Post AG holds an 80% stake in the Turkish parcel service provider Aras Kargo. The profitability of this key subsidiary was further improved last year, achieving an EBIT of nearly 2 billion TRY. The set target value was thus significantly exceeded.
- bank99: An improvement in earnings was defined as a target for bank99. The earnings from operating activities of EUR -5.6m shows a good improvement in earnings compared to the previous year and is at target level.
- Delivery quality in the core business: In addition to the profitability of its services, Österreichische Post primarily focuses on service quality. The defined target for the delivery quality of letters was slightly exceeded in the past financial year with an "E+1" delivery rate of 95.1%. The "E+1" delivery rate for parcels was 97.0%, which is above the set target.
- Increase in Österreichische Post AG's e-vehicle fleet: Österreichische Post sets an example for electromobility with the country's largest electric vehicle fleet. With an e-vehicle fleet of over 5,000 vehicles, the target figure was exceeded.
- E-Mobility for freight companies: To further improve e-mobility, the use of electric vehicles among Österreichische Post's freight companies is to be promoted. The external delivery fleet was increased to 256 electric vehicles, exceeding the target.
- Freight company compliance: Freight company compliance: To meet supply chain due diligence obligations, a central monitoring system for the inspection and control of freight companies is to be established, and a defined number of company and personnel checks are to be carried out. The contents specified in the target definition were fully implemented.
- Employee satisfaction and corporate culture: In the past financial year, the implementation of defined measures from the employee survey, as well as the further development of corporate culture in distribution and the design of a culture programme for selected subsidiaries, were to be carried out. The 120% target was achieved.

At the beginning of 2025, the Remuneration Committee reviewed the target achievement of the modifier (range 0.8 to 1.2). Based on the available documentation and due to the fact that the overall performance in the described criteria was slightly exceeded, a modifier of 1.15 was determined. This results in an overall target achievement for the Short-Term Incentive 2024 of 164.14%.

The individual, contractually defined target amount multiplied by the percentage of total target achievement (financial targets and modifier) results in the acquired entitlements for the past financial year 2024 and the amounts that will be paid out in the following year. Due to the fact that the entitlement to remuneration from variable salary components is limited and a maximum of 150% of the target value is paid for the short-term incentive programme, the Management Board members are entitled to the amounts listed below.

Short-Term Incentive 2024

EUR		Georg Pölzl	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum
Target value ¹		524,044 ³	493,355	435,814
Overall target achievement	150,00%,			
STI 2024²		786,066	740,033	653,721

¹ According to employment contract

² Payment in 2025

³ Retired as of 30 September 2024 - therefore pro-rata share of target value

3.3 Long-term variable remuneration 2022-2024 (LTI 2022-2024)

The long-term share-based remuneration component relevant for the past financial year, the Long-Term Incentive, is presented below. The entitlements acquired in the past financial year arose from the Long-Term Incentive Programme 2022-2024, whose three-year performance period ended on 31 December 2024. The parameters of the LTI 2022-2024 were set by the Remuneration Committee at the beginning of the term and reviewed with regard to their target achievement once the annual financial statements and consolidated financial statements for 2024 were available. The entitlements will be paid out in 2025.

As previously mentioned, the framework conditions for the Long-Term Incentive Programme 2022-2024 were defined in 2022, prior to the establishment and adoption of the new remuneration policy at the Annual General Meeting. Apart from a few aspects, such as the consideration of ESG targets, the LTI 2022-2024 already follows the logic of the current remuneration system. The application of capital market-relevant control parameters, the required equity investment, and the positive share price relation have always been essential aspects in the design of long-term variable remuneration in past tranches.

A prerequisite for participation in the LTI is a one-time personal investment by each Management Board member in relation to the basic salary: 80% for the CEO, 70% for the Deputy CEO and 60% for other Management Board members. The personal investment must be retained uninterrupted until the end of the year following the expiration of the performance period. The required shares of the LTI Programme 2022-2024 must be held until the end of 2025 and are shown in the table below.

Personal investment

	Required number of shares	Equivalent value in EUR ¹
Georg Pözl	15,038	560,015
Walter Oblin	9,775	364,021
Peter Umundum	7,573	282,019

¹ On the basis of the average share price Q4 2021

The performance criteria underlying the LTI Programme 2022-2024 (earnings per share, free cash flow and relative total shareholder return) should optimally take account of the long-term increase in the Company's value. They reflect the Company's ability to invest and pay dividends as well as its overall business development and are essential for the long-term management of Österreichische Post.

The weighting of the criteria and the setting of the annual interim targets are shown in the table below.

Weighting of the criteria

Criteria	Weighting	Annual target achievement weighting during the three-year performance period
Earnings per share	1/3	20%/20%/60%
Free cash flow	1/3	20%/20%/60%
Relative total shareholder return	1/3	20%/20%/60%

The 100% target values as well as the threshold and maximum values for the criteria were determined by the Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board at the beginning of 2022. They take into account the medium-term planning, any special effects and the historical development of the performance indicators as well as current market developments.

Indicator 1 "Earnings per share" (target range between 0% and 200% is possible):

In the years 2022 to 2024, the range of the target value was between EUR 1.21 /share (0% target achievement when below that value) and EUR 2.42 /share (200% target achievement). The actual values in this three-year period were between EUR 1.90/share and EUR 2.16/share.

Indicator 2 "Operating free cash flow" (target range between 0% and 200% possible):

In the years 2022 to 2024, the range of the target value was between EUR 112.0m (0% target achievement when below that value) and EUR 168.0m (200% target achievement). The actual values in this three-year period were between EUR 183.1m and EUR 253.9m.

Indicator 3 "Relative total shareholder return":

The total shareholder return of each year is ranked with the total shareholder return of the companies listed in the EURO STOXX Total Market Industrial Transportation index, and the relative positioning of Österreichische Post is determined on the basis of the percentile achieved (percentile rank). In the years 2022 to 2024, the range of target value was between the 25th percentile (0% target achievement when below that value) and 75th percentile (200% target achievement). The actual values in this three-year period were between the 17th percentile and the 61st percentile.

After the submission of the annual financial statements and consolidated financial statements and confirmation by the auditor, the Remuneration Committee evaluated the target achievement of the individual LTI criteria. Based on the actual values, which were adjusted for selected special effects to ensure comparability of target and actual values, the target achievement is shown below. The overall target achievement is made up of the partial target achievements of each indicator per year and amounts to 131.8% for the three-year period of the LTI programme that expired in 2024.

Target achievement of the criteria

Target achievement in %	2022	2023	2024
Earnings per share	8.8%	10.6%	30.9%
Free cash flow	13.3%	13.3%	40.0%
Total shareholder return (relative to the index)	5.2%	9.6%	0.0%
ANNUAL TARGET ACHIEVEMENT	27.4%	33.6%	70.9%
OVERALL TARGET ACHIEVEMENT			131.8%

The bonus granted for the overall target achievement is based on performance share units (PSU, bonus shares) as a mathematical value. Based on the number of PSU at the beginning of the programme, which is calculated by multiplying the contractually defined target value by the reference share price Q4 2021, the final number of PSU is calculated by multiplying it by the degree of target achievement. The model calculated values of the LTI are based on the determined target achievement of 131.8% and applying the share price relevant for the payout in Q4 2024 (plus dividends paid out during the three-year performance period).

The performance share units can be paid out in the form of Österreichische Post shares or in cash. For the LTI Programme 2022–2024 the decision on the form of payment was at the discretion of the Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board, which has decided on payment in cash.

Long-Term Incentive 2022-2024 (model calculated value)

EUR		Georg Pölzl	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum
Target value ¹		857,500	436,800	361,900
Share price Q4 2021	37.24			
Bonus shares at the beginning (number)		23,026	11,729	9,718
Overall target achievement	131.8%			
Bonus shares at the end (number)		30,355	15,462	12,811
Share price Q4 2024	28.99			
Total accumulated dividends paid ²	5.43			
LTI 2022-2024 MODEL CALCULATED VALUE		1,044,819	532,202	440,955

¹ Specified in the agreement on LTI 2022-2024

² Dividends in the individual years: EUR 1.90/share paid in 2022; EUR 1.75/share paid in 2023; EUR 1.78/share paid in 2024

As stipulated in the 2020 Remuneration Policy for the Management Board, the employment contracts of the Management Board members define upper limits for the total remuneration of a financial year. These upper limits – hereinafter referred to as "salary caps" – are to be taken into account when determining the amount to be paid out for the LTI in that any exceeding of the upper limit leads to a reduction in the amount to be paid out for the LTI.

The salary cap for the 2022 financial year is to be applied when assessing the relevant maximum amounts for the payment of the LTI programme expiring in 2024. The cap is comprised of (i) the fixed basic salary 2022, (ii) the STI 2022 (paid in 2023) and (iii) the LTI 2022-2024 (paid in 2025).

The following table shows the maximum possible entitlements of the Management Board members. The amounts actually paid out for the LTI 2022-2024 are calculated on the basis of the "salary cap" upper limit. The LTI entitlements actually acquired by Walter Oblin and Peter Umundum are therefore slightly below the LTI model calculated value. The payout amount for Georg Pölzl corresponds to the model calculated value.

Long-Term Incentive 2022-2024 (entitlement)

EUR	Georg Pölzl	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum
Upper limit "Salary Cap" 2022	2,865,000	1,768,000	1,551,000
Fixed basic salary 2022	700,000	520,000	470,000
STI 2022 ¹	987,630	733,668	663,123
LTI 2022-2024 maximum possible entitlements	1,177,370	514,332	417,877
LTI 2022-2024 ENTITLEMENTS ACCORDING TO "SALARY CAP"²	1,044,819	514,332	417,877

¹ Payment in 2023

² Payment in 2025

3.4 Remuneration awarded from current LTI programmes

Since the introduction of the share-based remuneration programme in 2010, a new three-year LTI tranche begins each financial year. All three Management Board members were participating in the LTI tranches 13 (2022-2024), 14 (2023-2025) and 15 (2024-2026) as of 31 December 2024.

The number of Performance Share Units (calculated value) assigned to the individual tranches as of 31 December 2024 is as follows:

Bonus shares

Number	Georg Pölzl	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum
Tranche 13 (LTI 2022-2024)	23,026	11,729	9,718
Tranche 14 (LTI 2023-2025)	28,413	14,473	11,991
Tranche 15 (LTI 2024-2026)	20,436	19,733	15,888

As already explained, the performance share units can be paid out in the form of Österreichische Post shares or in cash. The decision on the form of payment is at the discretion of the Supervisory Board's Remuneration Committee. According to past business practice, payment in cash is to be expected, which is why cash-settled share-based payments are accounted for.

For the expected cash payments, provisions are allocated for the expected future total costs of all existing and ongoing LTI programmes at the balance sheet date based on fair values.

Carrying amount of provisions

EUR	Georg Pözl	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum
Tranche 13 (LTI 2022-2024)	1,038,520	514,332	417,877
Tranche 14 (LTI 2023-2025)	1,085,239	345,200	243,976
Tranche 15 (LTI 2024-2026)	1,151,904	370,759	274,229

The total costs reported for the share-based remuneration of the Management Board members in the 2024 financial year is assigned to the individual tranches as follows:


Total cost

EUR	Georg Pözl	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum
Tranche 13 (LTI 2022-2024)	279,355	182,692	148,431
Tranche 14 (LTI 2023-2025)	737,527	179,297	126,721
Tranche 15 (LTI 2024-2026)	1,151,904	370,759	274,229


3.5 Overview of the total remuneration of the Management Board

The following explanations and tables provide an overview of the remuneration of the Management Board. The entitlements arising in the 2024 financial year for the members of the Management Board of Österreichische Post amount to approximately EUR 5.9m (2023: EUR 6.2m). Of this amount, approximately EUR 1.8m is accounted for by non-performance-related fixed components (2023: EUR 1.9m). The performance-related variable components are made up as follows: short-term variable remuneration EUR 2.2m (2023: EUR 2.5m) and long-term variable remuneration EUR 2.0m (2023: EUR 1.9m).

Total remuneration (EUR k)




Variable remuneration (EUR k)



On balance, the total remuneration of the Management Board thus shows a decrease of 4.9% compared to the previous year. The fixed remuneration has decreased by 8.0% due to the prorating of Georg Pözl's base salary following the termination of his employment as of 30th September 2024. The variable components show a slight decrease of 3.6%. While the STI bonus decreased by 11.3% compared to the previous year due to the prorating of Georg Pözl's target value, the entitlements from the LTI 2022-2024 increased by 6.7% compared to the previous year's tranche.

The total remuneration of the Management Board in 2024 shows an almost stable development in its structural distribution of remuneration elements compared to the previous year. The share of fixed salary components has decreased slightly compared to the previous year, from 31% to 30%. The variable remuneration components, STI and LTI, increased slightly from 69% to 70%. With an increase in the long-term incentive from 30% to 33%, the share of the short-term incentive decreased slightly from 39% to 37%.

Distribution of remuneration components (%)



In summary, the following table shows the total entitlements acquired by the Management Board in 2024¹. In addition to the remuneration of the individual Management Board members, the relative share of fixed and variable remuneration components is also shown.

Total remuneration 2024				
EUR	Georg Pölzl	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum	Total
Fixed remuneration 2024	597,281	618,549	544,761	1,760,592
Variable remuneration				
STI 2024 ¹	786,066	740,033	653,721	2,179,820
LTI 2022-2024 ¹	1,044,819	514,332	417,877	1,977,028
Total variable remuneration	1,830,885	1,254,365	1,071,598	4,156,848
TOTAL	2,428,166	1,872,914	1,616,360	5,917,440
Relative share of fixed remuneration (%)	24.6	33.0	33.7	
Relative share of variable remuneration (%)				
STI 2024	32.4	39.5	40.4	
LTI 2022-2024	43.0	27.5	25.9	

¹ Payment in 2025

In comparison, the table below shows the total acquired entitlements of the Management Board in 2023, of which the fixed basic salary was paid out in 2023 and the variable components in 2024.

Total remuneration 2023				
EUR	Georg Pölzl	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum	Total
Fixed remuneration 2023	791,457	587,979	535,163	1,914,598
Variable remuneration				
STI 2023 ¹	1,017,800	756,080	683,380	2,457,260
LTI 2021-2023 ¹	1,015,000	468,000	370,714	1,853,714
Total variable remuneration	2,032,800	1,224,080	1,054,094	4,310,974
TOTAL	2,824,257	1,812,058	1,589,257	6,225,572

¹ Payment in 2024

Pursuant to Section 78c Austrian Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the annual change in total remuneration of the Management Board, the business success of the Company and the average salaries of other employees of the Company on a full-time equivalent basis should be illustrated in a comparative presentation.

EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation) and EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) are the most important key figures used by Österreichische Post to measure its operating success. Expressed as a percentage of revenue, they illustrate the profitability of revenue and show how successfully the operating business is being managed.

¹ The presentation differs from the mandatory disclosures in the notes in accordance with the Austrian Commercial Code (UGB) and IFRS (remuneration to active and former members of the Management Board) due to different disclosure requirements and is therefore only comparable to a limited extent.

EBITDA increased by 8.0% compared to the previous year to EUR 422.7m. EBIT 2024 of EUR 207.3m increased by 9.0% compared to the previous year.

As a comparative figure for the salaries earned by other employees, the salaries/wages and bonuses for employees of Österreichische Post AG who were continuously employed throughout the financial year and in the comparative periods are used on a full-time equivalent basis.

Annual change					
Total	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Change (%)		vs 2020	vs 2021	vs 2022	vs 2023
Total remuneration (EUR)					
Georg Pözl	2,456,089	2,809,388	2,910,117	2,824,257	2,428,166
		14.4%	3.6%	-3.0%	-14.0%
Walter Oblin	1,666,542	1,794,892	1,879,730	1,812,058	1,872,914
		7.7%	4.7%	-3.6%	3.4%
Peter Umundum	1,487,483	1,573,007	1,630,381	1,589,257	1,616,360
		5.7%	3.6%	-2.5%	1.7%
Total	5,610,114	6,177,287	6,420,228	6,225,572	5,917,440
		10.1%	3.9%	-3.0%	-4.9%
Economic performance indicators (EUR m)					
Revenue	2,192 ¹	2,520	2,522	2,741	3,123
		14.9%	0.1%	8.7%	13.9%
EBITDA	303	370	373	392	423
		22.3%	0.6%	5.0%	8.0%
EBIT	161	205	188	190	207
		27.5%	-8.0%	1.0%	9.0%
Remuneration paid to other employees on a full-time equivalent basis (EUR)					
Civil servants	54,772	55,507	57,937	61,467	67,087
		1.3%	4.4%	6.1%	9.1%
Salaried employees – General Service Regulation/Special contract	46,138	46,579	49,119	52,708	57,806
		1.0%	5.5%	7.3%	9.7%
Salaried employees - New collective labour agreement	37,299	38,489	41,947	45,060	49,463
		3.2%	9.0%	7.4%	9.8%

¹ The presentation of financial services in the consolidated income statement has been adjusted. Income from financial services is reported under revenue, the expenses for financial services are reported separately (previously reported on a net basis in revenue of income and expenses from financial services).

4. Remuneration of the Supervisory Board 2024

The Remuneration Policy for the Supervisory Board of Österreichische Post stipulates a fixed remuneration that is independent of performance. Variable remuneration components are not provided for, as the Supervisory Board has no responsibility for the earnings of Österreichische Post. The remuneration for Supervisory Board members consists of an annual basic remuneration and a committee remuneration as well as attendance fees paid for each Supervisory Board meeting attended. Furthermore, every Supervisory Board member is entitled to be reimbursed for appropriate cash expenditures, especially relevant travel costs. The remuneration system provides for different levels of remuneration, depending upon the individual's position as the Chair, Deputy Chair or member of the Supervisory Board.

The amount of remuneration paid to Supervisory Board members is resolved upon by the Annual General Meeting for the particular previous financial year. The Annual General Meeting held on 18 April 2024 specified the remuneration for the Supervisory Board members for the 2023 financial year as follows:

Remuneration of the Supervisory Board

EUR	
Chair	36,000
Deputy Chair	30,000
For every other Supervisory Board member	24,000
Committee Chair	17,000
Deputy Chair of the Audit Committee	14,000
For every other committee member	12,000
Attendance fee	800
Attendance fee for international expert ¹	1,800

¹ For participation in meetings of the Supervisory Board in a form other than physical presence, the attendance fee shall in any case be EUR 800 per member and meeting.

Committee remuneration is limited to membership on one committee and is thus paid only once even if a member of the Supervisory Board belongs to several committees. If members of the Supervisory Board or a committee have not belonged to the body for the entire financial year, the remuneration shall be paid on a pro rata (daily) basis.

In the past financial year, the following change occurred in the composition of the Supervisory Board: At the Annual General Meeting on 18 April 2024, Sigrid Stagl stepped down from the Supervisory Board and Maria Zesch was elected as a new member. Felicia Kölliker's Supervisory Board mandate was also extended.

There was no change from the employee representatives.

The shareholder representatives of the Supervisory Board hold the following positions on the committees:

- Nomination Committee: Elisabeth Stadler (Chair), Stefan Fürnsinn
- Remuneration Committee: Elisabeth Stadler (Chair), Stefan Fürnsinn, Peter E. Kruse
- Audit Committee: Bernhard Spalt (Chair, financial expert), Stefan Fürnsinn (Deputy Chair), Huberta Gheneff, Sigrid Stagl (until 18 April 2024)
- Banking Committee: Bernhard Spalt (Chair), Felicia Kölliker

Both the plenary sessions and the committee meetings were fully attended. The employee representatives perform their duties on the Supervisory Board on an honorary basis and are compensated for their involvement in the Central Works Council in accordance with their respective employment contracts. They are entitled to reimbursement of expenses, which can also be granted as a lump sum. This results in the following entitlements for the shareholder representatives on the Supervisory Board for their work in the 2024 financial year.

Remuneration of the Supervisory Board in 2024

EUR

Name	Basic remuneration ¹	Committee remuneration ¹	Attendance fees	Total
Elisabeth Stadler (Chair)	36,000	17,000	12,800	65,800
Stefan Fürnsinn (Deputy Chair) ²	30,000	14,000	16,000	60,000
Huberta Gheneff	24,000	12,000	6,400	42,400
Felicia Kölliker	24,000	12,000	11,400	47,400
Peter E. Kruse	24,000	12,000	14,200	50,200
Bernhard Spalt	24,000	17,000	9,600	50,600
Sigrid Stagl ³	7,148	3,574	1,600	12,321
Christiane Wenckheim	24,000	-	3,200	27,200
Maria Zesch ⁴	16,918	-	2,400	19,318
TOTAL	210,066	87,574	77,600	375,239

¹ Payment in 2025, subject to the approval of the Annual General Meeting 2025

² Remuneration will be transferred to Österreichische Beteiligungs AG (ÖBAG)

³ Retired as of 18 April 2024 - therefore pro-rata share of remuneration

⁴ Since 18 April 2024 - therefore pro-rata share of remuneration

The following table shows the comparative values for the 2023 financial year.

Remuneration of the Supervisory Board in 2023¹

EUR

Name	Basic remuneration ²	Committee remuneration ²	Attendance fee	Total
Elisabeth Stadler (Chair) ³	25,249	11,923	9,600	46,773
Stefan Fürnsinn (Deputy Chair) ⁴	21,041	9,819	12,000	42,860
Huberta Gheneff	24,000	12,000	8,800	44,800
Felicia Kölliker	24,000	12,000	16,800	52,800
Peter E. Kruse	24,000	13,507	18,800	56,307
Bernhard Spalt ³	16,833	11,923	8,000	36,756
Sigrid Stagl	24,000	8,416 ³	7,200	39,616
Christiane Wenckheim ³	16,833	-	4,000	20,833
Edith Hlawati ⁵	10,849	5,123	4,800	20,772
Chris E. Muntwyler ⁶	7,233	3,616	9,600	20,449
Stefan Szyszkowitz ⁶	7,233	5,123	2,400	14,756
Carola Wahl ⁶	9,041	5,123	5,600	19,764
TOTAL	210,312	98,574	107,600	416,486

¹ Employee representatives are exempt

² Payment in 2024

³ Since 20 April 2023 - therefore pro-rata share of remuneration

⁴ Since 20 April 2023 - therefore pro rata share of remuneration; remuneration will be transferred to Österreichische Beteiligungs AG (ÖBAG)

⁵ Retired as of 20 April 2023 - therefore pro-rata share of remuneration; remuneration will be transferred to Österreichische Beteiligungs AG (ÖBAG)

⁶ Retired as of 20 April 2023 - therefore pro-rata share of remuneration

6 March 2025

Elisabeth Stadler m.p.
Chair of the Supervisory Board

Walter Oblin m.p.
Chair of the Management Board