

**Remuneration Report for the members
of the Management Board and the
Supervisory Board of Österreichische
Post AG (Austrian Post) for the
financial year 2025**

1. Introduction

This Remuneration Report describes the basic features of the remuneration systems for the members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board of Österreichische Post and provides information on the remuneration awarded and due to the members of the Management Board as well as the remuneration of the Supervisory Board in the 2025 financial year. It takes into account the requirements set out in Sections 78c and 98a AktG and is based on Statement 37 of the Austrian Financial Reporting and Auditing Committee ("AFRAC Statement").

The Remuneration Report was reviewed by the Remuneration Committee of Österreichische Post and approved by the Supervisory Board at its meeting held on 10 March 2026. In accordance with corporate law requirements, the Remuneration Report will be presented for resolution at the Annual General Meeting on 15 April 2026. Last year's Remuneration Report for the members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board was approved at the Annual General Meeting on 9 April 2025 with a majority of 90.3%.

Economic development in the past financial year

In 2025, Österreichische Post was confronted with challenging economic conditions. Against the backdrop of economic uncertainties, the fundamental trends in the international mail and parcel markets remain unchanged. Cost pressures and digitalisation among private and public customer groups continue to lead to declining letter and advertising mail volumes. At the same time, the growing parcel markets are characterised by intense competition.

Following an exceptionally strong year in 2024 – shaped by special effects such as major elections in Austria and positive currency effects – both revenue and earnings fell short of the previous year's levels. Despite these conditions, Austrian Post managed to perform well operationally.

The Austrian Post Group's revenue in 2025 amounted to EUR 3,043.3m, 2.6% below the 2024 level but 11.0% above 2023. In the Mail Division, revenue declined by 6.8% (-3.0% compared to 2023), primarily due to the structural reduction in addressed letter volumes driven by electronic substitution as well as the absence of the positive special effects seen in the previous year. The Parcel & Logistics Division recorded a slight increase of 0.4% (+21.4% compared with 2023), with positive developments in Austria and a decline in revenue in Turkey and in South-East and Eastern Europe. In the Retail & Bank Division, revenue decreased by 8.8% (+9.0% compared with 2023), both in retail services and in financial services due to the lower key interest rate compared with the previous year.

In terms of earnings, EBIT fell by 5.0% to EUR 196.9m (+3.5 % compared to 2023), influenced by the decline in revenue as well as inflation-related cost increases. EBITDA decreased by 2.2% to EUR 413.3m (+5.6 % compared to 2023).

Earnings per share in 2025 amounted to EUR 1.96 after EUR 2.04 in the previous year. Based on the good result, strong cash flow and the solid balance sheet, a dividend of EUR 1.83 per share will therefore be proposed to the Annual General Meeting on 15 April 2026. This continues to be based on maintaining a predictable dividend policy. Since its IPO in 2006, Österreichische Post has pursued the goal of distributing a dividend of at least 75% of the Group net profit.

2. Basic features of the Remuneration Policy for the Management Board

The current remuneration system for the Management Board members was approved at the Annual General Meeting held on 18 April 2024.

The remuneration system for the Management Board is designed to create incentives for the Management Board members to actively pursue the Group strategy and ensure a sustainable positive development of the Company. These efforts are promoted through the design of the remuneration components and in particular through the setting of criteria for variable remuneration in line with the Company's integrated corporate and sustainability strategy.

The following principles apply to the remuneration of the Management Board:

- Implementation of the Group strategy: The specification of the performance criteria must be in line with the Group's business strategy. The targets thus take into account the strategy, the business model and the positioning of the Company.
- Linking remuneration and performance: The variable performance-based component should have a disproportionate share of the total remuneration and include ambitious targets in the performance criteria.
- The variable remuneration is aimed at sustainable corporate development and shareholder interests: A significant portion of the variable remuneration should take into account long-term performance and reflect the development of the Post share as well as non-financial indicators and components.


Structure of the remuneration for the Management Board

The remuneration of the Management Board includes fixed and variable salary components. The variable remuneration is divided into two components and consists of an annual bonus (Short-Term Incentive, STI) and a long-term variable remuneration (Long-Term Incentive, LTI). These variable components are linked to performance and dependent on the achievement of financial and non-financial performance criteria derived from the strategic goals and operational management of the Company.

The majority of the remuneration of the Management Board members is made up of the variable, performance-based remuneration components, the amount of which is determined by the performance of the Management Board members and the success of the Company. At the beginning of each financial year, the remuneration committee sets target values for all performance criteria of the variable remuneration, the degree of achievement of which determines the amount of the actual payment.

When setting the target values and the lower and upper thresholds, the Remuneration Committee ensures that they are adequate and ambitious. If the targets are not met, the variable compensation can drop to zero. If the targets are significantly exceeded, the achievement of the targets is limited because threshold values are set. Furthermore, the Management Board remuneration is subject to a malus and clawback regulation, which under certain conditions (financial situation of the company, miscalculations, misconduct) can result in a reduction of STI and LTI remuneration that has not yet been paid out or a clawback of STI and LTI remuneration that has already been paid out.

Remuneration system for the Management Board of Österreichische Post



Fixed remuneration

The fixed basic salary takes into account the range of the duties and responsibilities of the respective Management Board member as well as the duration of the term of office on the Management Board. Furthermore, the basic salary is based on the salary structure of publicly listed Austrian companies and comparable international publicly listed companies. For this purpose, a benchmark covering the 20 ATX companies in Austria, the 50 medium-sized comparable MDAX companies in Germany as well as a further 15 European logistics companies is also taken into account.

In addition to the fixed basic salary, the fixed remuneration also includes benefits in kind, various types of insurance coverage and pension fund contributions.

Variable remuneration

The variable remuneration consists of two elements: the Short-Term Incentive with a one-year performance period as well as the Long-Term Incentive with a three-year performance period and a four-year holding period for the personal investment. The combination of a short-term and long-term observation period creates an incentive in business management to achieve a balanced relationship between short-term and long-term interests.

The targets for the variable remuneration components agreed upon with the Management Board members are consistent with the Group strategy, sustainable corporate development and the interests of all stakeholders. For this reason, the performance criteria consist of both financial and non-financial aspects.

ESG targets are embedded in both the STI and the LTI and are selected annually from the Post ESG criteria catalogue. The Post ESG criteria catalogue is derived from the 2030 Sustainability Master Plan, which defines goals and measures from the three strategic areas of sustainability "Economy & Customers", "Environment & Climate" and "People & Social". The chart below shows the current Post ESG criteria catalogue, which may be amended depending on future strategic prioritisation.

Post ESG Criteria Catalogue

Economy & Customers	Environment & Climate	People & Social
Customer Satisfaction	Climate Change - CO ₂ Emissions and Adaptation Measures	Corporate Culture
Quality of Service	Resource Consumption	Occupational Safety
Reliability of Supply	Energy Efficiency	Occupational Health
Sustainable Procurement / Supply Chain	Electric Vehicles	Data Protection and Data Security
Human Rights	Non-Fossil Fuels	Employee Satisfaction
Reporting and ESG Ratings	Renewable Energies (PV Systems, Wind Power)	Diversity and Inclusion
Governance and Compliance	Recycling and Environmental Management	Employer Attractiveness (Recommendation)
Increase in Value and Innovations of the Company	Circular Economy	Social Engagement

Short-Term Incentive (STI) Programme

The STI is designed to reward performance in the past financial year in line with the short-term development of the Company. At the beginning of each financial year, target values are defined for the two key financial performance indicators of Österreichische Post, namely "revenue" and "EBIT" (earnings before interest and tax) and optionally for a third financial

metric. After the financial year has come to a close, the Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board determines the specific target achievement value for the two indicators of revenue and EBIT on the basis of the audited consolidated annual financial statements.

The financial targets can vary in their degree of achievement between 0% and 150%, whereby thresholds are defined for the two indicators revenue and EBIT at a target achievement of 50%.


A modifier is to be applied to the financial target achievement, which can influence the level of target achievement by a maximum of +/- 20%. The actual amount of the bandwidth is defined for each financial year as part of the definition of the target criteria. The modifier establishes the direct reference to strategic initiatives as well as to the sustainability strategy and the ESG indicators. The Remuneration Committee annually defines focal points on the aspects of Economy & Customers, Environment & Climate and People & Social, which are derived from Österreichische Post's current subject areas and defined in the Post ESG criteria catalogue.

The assessment of the implementation of the focal points specified in the STI modifier results from the assessment by the Remuneration Committee, which is summarised and documented in a report. The modifier is 1.0 for 100% target achievement and shall be set differently if the performance in the described aspects exceeds or falls short of expectations.

The STI payout amount is calculated using the contractually defined target value. The specific STI payout amount is derived from the percentage calculated taking into account the target achievement of the financial parameters and the determination of the modifier. The STI pays out a maximum of 150% of the target value.

The following chart provides an overview of the STI.

Presentation of the Short-Term Incentive Programme of Österreichische Post



Long-Term Incentive (LTI) Programme

The LTI is intended to reward the long-term sustainable performance of the Management Board members and also to ensure alignment with the interests of the shareholders in a positive development of the share price. The methodology of this programme strengthens this objective through a required personal investment of the Management Board members in shares of the Company, through the long retention period and the positive share price relation from the start to the end of the programme after three years.

The starting point for the LTI is Performance Share Units (PSU), which are calculated via the contractually defined target value divided by the start reference share price. The target value is contractually set individually for each Management Board Member.

The incentive in the form of the final number of PSU is calculated by multiplying the number of PSU at the beginning of the programme by the degree of target achievement, which can range from 0% to 200%. The final reference share price at the end of the three-year performance period, plus the dividend per share paid during the performance period, is used to determine the payout amount. The LTI payout amount is in any case capped at 200% of the contractually defined target value.

The target criteria used for the LTI include two to three financial targets and since 2024 one ESG target. The financial target criteria each weighted at 15-40%, are as follows: Earnings per share as net earnings and basis for the dividend policy and operating free cash flow as basis for the ability to pay dividends. As a third target the relative total shareholder return (e.g. EURO STOXX Total Market Industrial Transportation index) or a strategic target (e.g. market share) can be used. The ESG target, weighted at 20-33%, consists of a maximum of three topics from the Post ESG criteria catalogue, which are defined annually by the Remuneration Committee for the respective LTI programme.

For the LTI 2023-2025 attributable to the reporting year 2025 – described in Chapter 3.3 – the 2020 Remuneration Policy applies. The target criteria used accordingly are each weighted at one-third and include the following control parameters: earnings per share, operating free cash flow, and relative total shareholder return (TSR). The consideration of ESG criteria in the long-term variable remuneration component has been implemented with the new remuneration logic since 2024.

The 100% target values as well as the threshold and maximum values for the criteria are determined by the Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board at the beginning of the programme and take into account the medium-term planning and, if applicable, special effects and the historical development of performance indicators as well as current market developments. The maximum target achievement for the performance indicators is set at 200% of the target value.

After the end of the three-year performance period, the auditor confirms the achievement of the targets following the approval of the consolidated results of Österreichische Post. Based on this target achievement, the degree of target achievement and the LTI payout amount are determined by the Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board. For the LTI, the maximum amount to be paid out is limited to 200% of the defined target value.

The following chart provides an overview of the LTI. This system applies to all current programmes since 2024.

Presentation of the Long-Term Incentive Programme of Österreichische Post



3. Remuneration of the Management Board 2025

This chapter describes the concrete application of the remuneration system for the members of the Management Board of Österreichische Post in the 2025 financial year. It contains detailed information on the total remuneration of the Management Board, the target setting and target achievement of the variable remuneration, as well as information on the remuneration of the individual Management Board members for the 2025 financial year.

In the following, both the remuneration awarded and the remuneration due to the Management Board members are presented. The **remuneration due** includes the amounts actually paid to the Management Board member within a specified period which are to be assigned to the current period under review. On the other hand, it also includes entitlements definitively acquired in this period, even if payment takes place in a later period. The **remuneration awarded** relates to provisions allocated in a financial year as well as other accrued remuneration components made on the basis of legal or contractual obligations which must be economically allocated in this reporting period although the final specification and payment will take place in subsequent periods. With the exception of the information presented in chapter 3.4 "Remuneration awarded from current LTI programmes", all tables include remuneration components due, i.e. amounts actually received or entitlements definitively acquired. This allows for a good comparability of the annual remunerations.

The only members of the Management Board of Österreichische Post in the 2025 financial year were Walter Oblin, Peter Umundum and Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner. Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner has been the Chief Financial Officer of Austrian Post since 1 January 2025. In the following section, the type and amount of the individual remuneration components for every Management Board member will be presented along with a subsequent synopsis.

Georg Pözl stepped down from Austrian Post's Management Board as planned on 30 September 2024 after his contract expired and took his retirement. His participation in LTI tranches 14 (2023-2025) and 15 (2024-2026) results in payouts that will run until 2027.

3.1 Fixed remuneration

The fixed remuneration of the Management Board members 2025 consisted of the fixed basic salary, benefits in kind, various insurance policies and pension fund contributions.

Benefits in kind include the provision of a car for official and private purposes, including a driver (taxable benefit calculated in accordance with the Austrian Income Tax Act), as well as the reimbursement of the costs of a telephone connection/mobile phone intended for business and private purposes.

The benefits of an accident insurance policy are also listed, which provides additional insurance coverage in the event of death and in case of invalidity, whether they are on-duty or off-duty. Furthermore, there is the possibility of participating in a management group health insurance scheme.

All members of the Management Board are entitled to contributions made by the Company to a voluntary pension fund concluded with APK Pensionskasse AG. The pension fund contributions are set at 10% of the fixed basic salary.

Fixed remuneration			
EUR	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum	Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner¹
Fixed basic salary	620,000	500,000	340,000
Benefits in kind	174	12,894	4,670
Group health insurance	-	1,617	-
Accident insurance	2,992	2,413	1,641
Pension fund contribution	63,550	51,250	34,850 ²
TOTAL FIXED REMUNERATION	686,716	568,174	381,161

¹ Member of the Management Board since 1 January 2025

² For Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner, vesting will only occur after a period of five years, on 31 December 2029

In addition to the above-mentioned insurance policies, the members of the Management Board of Österreichische Post are also insured within the context of a Directors and Officers Liability Insurance (D&O). The insurance provides judicial and extrajudicial protection against unfounded claims for damages as well as the settlement of claims considered to be legally justified.

3.2 Short-term variable remuneration 2025 (STI 2025)

This chapter describes the entitlements acquired in 2025 based on the STI agreement concluded at the beginning of 2025. The evaluation of the relevant performance criteria has been carried out by the Remuneration Committee at the beginning of the year 2026 on the basis of the audited annual financial statements and consolidated financial statements. The payment of the entitlements will be made at a later date. The amounts paid out in 2025 from the STI agreement 2024 are shown in the general overview.

In accordance with the Remuneration Policy approved by the 2024 Annual General Meeting, the financial criteria "revenue" (weighted at 40%) and "EBIT" (weighted at 60%) and also non-financial criteria in the form of a modifier of a maximum of +/-20% are used for the assessment of the short-term variable remuneration. For 2025, the Remuneration Committee has set the modifier as a multiplier in the range of 0.8 to 1.2 (+/-20%).

Weighting of the criteria

Area	Criteria	Weighting
Financial targets	Revenue	40%
	EBIT (before special effects)	60%
Modifier	A value between 0.8 and 1.2 is defined at the discretion of the Remuneration Committee on the basis of a pre-defined catalogue.	+/-20% multiplier ¹

¹ For the STI 2025, a multiplier of +/-20% was set within the given framework of the Remuneration Policy

The following table shows the values set by the Remuneration Committee at the beginning of 2025 for the financial target criteria "revenue" and "EBIT" at 50%, 100% and 150% target achievement. The target criteria are based on the plan values for 2025 approved by the Supervisory Board. There were no adjustments to the financial criteria during the year.

After the submission of the annual financial statements and consolidated financial statements and confirmation by the auditor, the Remuneration Committee evaluated the level of target achievement. Österreichische Post generated revenue of EUR 3,043.3m and therefore fell short of the target value. The reported EBIT of EUR 196.9m reflects an overachievement of the earnings target. The target achievement for the financial criteria is 87.2%.

Target achievement of the criteria

EUR m	50 % target	100 % target	150 % target	Actual value	Target achievement	Weighted target achievement
Revenue	3,025	3,135	3,245	3,043	58.3%	23.3%
EBIT	154	192	230	197	106.5%	63.9%
ACHIEVEMENT OF FINANCIAL TARGETS						87.2%

In addition to the financial criteria "revenue" and "EBIT", the modifier significantly determines the overall target achievement of the Short-Term Incentive. For the 2025 financial year, a catalogue of criteria was defined by the Remuneration Committee, which takes into account the strategic priorities and in particular the ESG indicators. More than 50% of the

indicators follow the objectives of the topics defined in Österreichische Post's "Sustainability Master Plan". The modifier was defined in a range of 0.8 to 1.2 in 2025, as well as associated target achievement indicators. Thus, the overall degree of target achievement can be influenced by +/-20%. The criteria defined for the modifier and their target achievement are described below.

- bank99: A target was defined for bank99 to improve its economic performance. With EUR 1.5m, the result from operations is significantly above the previous year and above the targeted value..
- Aras Kargo: Österreichische Post AG holds an 80% stake in the Turkish parcel service provider Aras Kargo. With EBIT of just over TRY 1 billion last year, the target was not achieved..
- Delivery quality in the core business: In addition to the profitability of its services, Österreichische Post keeps a strong focus on service quality. The defined target for the delivery quality of letters was slightly exceeded in the past financial year, with an "E+1" delivery rate of 95.3%. The "E+1" delivery rate for parcels was 95.2%, likewise slightly above the target.
- Customer satisfaction is a key priority for Österreichische Post. The customer satisfaction index, determined through regular surveys, stands at an average of 71 and is therefore slightly below the targeted value. In addition, all development and implementation steps defined as Management Board targets were fully completed at Group level.
- Increase in Österreichische Post AG's e-vehicle fleet: Österreichische Post sets an example for electromobility with the country's largest electric vehicle fleet. With an e-vehicle fleet of over 7,000 vehicles, the target figure was exceeded.
- Haulier compliance: To meet supply chain due diligence obligations, the number of subsidiaries included in the rollout of the system to ensure supply chain compliance was to be increased. This was implemented for ten subsidiaries, thus exceeding the target.
- Cyber security: In the past financial year, a maturity assessment and roadmap were to be prepared for subsidiaries. This was successfully implemented in seven subsidiaries, resulting in overachievement of the target.

At the beginning of 2026, the Remuneration Committee reviewed the target achievement of the modifier (range 0.8 to 1.2). Based on the available documentation and due to the fact that the overall performance in the described criteria was slightly exceeded, a modifier of 1.06 was determined. This results in an overall target achievement for the Short-Term Incentive 2025 of 92.47%.

The individual, contractually defined target amount multiplied by the percentage of total target achievement (financial targets and modifier) results in the acquired entitlements for the past financial year 2025 and the amounts that will be paid out in the following year.

Short-Term Incentive 2025

EUR		Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum	Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner ¹
Target value ²		414,000	334,000	227,000
Overall target achievement	92.47%			
STI 2025³		382,826	308,850	209,907

¹ Member of the Management Board since 1 January 2025

² According to employment contract

³ Payment in 2026

3.3 Long-term variable remuneration 2023-2025 (LTI 2023-2025)

The long-term share-based remuneration component relevant for the past financial year, the Long-Term Incentive, is presented below. In addition to the active members of the Management Board, this chapter also includes Georg Pözl, who stepped down from the Management Board as of 30 September 2024, as he continues to receive remuneration from the LTI programmes 2023-2025 and 2024-2026, with payouts extending until 2027. The entitlements acquired in the past financial

year arose from the Long-Term Incentive Programme 2023–2025, whose three-year performance period ended on 31 December 2025. The parameters of the LTI 2023–2025 were set by the Remuneration Committee at the beginning of the term and reviewed with regard to their target achievement once the annual financial statements and consolidated financial statements for 2025 were available. The entitlements will be paid out in 2026.

As previously mentioned, the framework conditions for the Long-Term Incentive Programme 2023-2025 were defined in 2023, prior to the establishment and adoption of the new remuneration policy at the Annual General Meeting. Apart from a few aspects, such as the consideration of ESG targets, the LTI 2023-2025 already follows the logic of the current remuneration system. The application of capital market-relevant control parameters, the required equity investment, and the positive share price relation have always been essential aspects in the design of long-term variable remuneration in past tranches.

A prerequisite for participation in the LTI is a one-time personal investment by each Management Board member in relation to the basic salary: 80% for the CEO, 70% for the Deputy CEO and 60% for other Management Board members. The personal investment must be retained uninterrupted until the end of the year following the expiration of the performance period. The required shares of the LTI Programme 2023-2025 must be held until the end of 2026 and are shown in the table below.

Personal investment

	Required number of shares	Equivalent value in EUR ¹
Walter Oblin	12,061	364,001
Peter Umundum	9,344	282,002
Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner ²	0	0
Georg Pölzl ³	18,556	560,020

¹ On the basis of the average share price Q4 2022

² Member of the Management Board since 1 January 2025

³ Retired as of 30 September 2024

The performance criteria underlying the LTI Programme 2023–2025 (earnings per share, operating free cash flow and relative total shareholder return) should optimally take account of the long-term increase in the Company's value. They reflect the Company's ability to invest and pay dividends as well as its overall business development and are essential for the long-term management of Österreichische Post.

The weighting of the criteria and the setting of the annual interim targets are shown in the table below.

Weighting of the criteria

Criteria	Weighting	Annual target achievement weighting during the three-year performance period
Earnings per share	1/3	20%/20%/60%
Operating free cash flow	1/3	20%/20%/60%
Relative total shareholder return	1/3	20%/20%/60%

The 100% target values as well as the threshold and maximum values for the criteria were determined by the Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board at the beginning of 2023 and are based on the underlying medium-term plan. Indicator 1 "Earnings per share" (target range between 0% and 200% is possible):

In the years 2023 to 2025, the range of the target value was between EUR 1.09 /share (0% target achievement when below that value) and EUR 2.13 /share (200% target achievement). The actual values in this three-year period were between EUR 1.96/share and EUR 2.04/share.

Indicator 2 "Operating free cash flow" (target range between 0% and 200% possible):

In the years 2023 to 2025, the range of the target value was between EUR 112.0m (0% target achievement when below that value) and EUR 168.0m (200% target achievement). The actual values in this three-year period were between EUR 221.6m and EUR 280.1m.

Indicator 3 "Relative total shareholder return":

The total shareholder return of each year is ranked with the total shareholder return of the companies listed in the EURO STOXX Total Market Industrial Transportation index, and the relative positioning of Österreichische Post is determined on the basis of the percentile achieved (percentile rank). In the years 2023 to 2025, the range of target value was between the 25th percentile (0% target achievement when below that value) and 75th percentile (200% target achievement). The actual values in this three-year period were between the 17th percentile and the 61st percentile.

After the submission of the annual financial statements and consolidated financial statements and confirmation by the auditor, the Remuneration Committee evaluated the target achievement of the individual LTI criteria. Based on the actual values determined, the target achievement presented below was calculated. The overall target achievement is made up of the partial target achievements of each indicator per year and amounts to 156.4% for the three-year period of the LTI programme that expired in 2025.

Target achievement of the criteria

Target achievement in %	2023	2024	2025
Earnings per share	12,5%	11,7%	33,1%
Operating free cash flow	13,3%	13,3%	40,0%
Total shareholder return (relative to the index)	9,6%	0,0%	22,9%
ANNUAL TARGET ACHIEVEMENT	35,4%	25,1%	95,9%
OVERALL TARGET ACHIEVEMENT			156,4%

The bonus granted for the overall target achievement is based on performance share units (PSU, bonus shares) as a mathematical value. Based on the number of PSU at the beginning of the programme, which is calculated by multiplying the contractually defined target value by the reference share price Q4 2022, the final number of PSU is calculated by multiplying it by the degree of target achievement. The model calculated values of the LTI are based on the determined target achievement of 156.4% and applying the share price relevant for the payout in Q4 2025 (plus dividends paid out during the three-year performance period).

The performance share units can be paid out in the form of Österreichische Post shares or in cash. For the LTI Programme 2023–2025 the decision on the form of payment was at the discretion of the Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board, which has decided on payment in cash.

Long-Term Incentive 2023-2025 (model calculated value)

EUR		Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum	Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner ¹	Georg Pölzl ²
Target value ³		436,800	361,900	-	857,500
Share price Q4 2022	30.18				
Bonus shares at the beginning (number)		14,473	11,991	-	28,413
Overall target achievement	156.4%				
Bonus shares at the end (number)		22,640	18,758	-	44,446
Share price Q4 2025	30.28				
Total accumulated dividends paid ⁴	5.36				
LTI 2023-2025 MODEL CALCULATED VALUE		806,890	668,535	-	1,584,055

¹ Member of the Management Board since 1 January 2025

² Retired as of 30 September 2024

³ Specified in the agreement on LTI 2023-2025

⁴ Dividends in the individual years: EUR 1.75/share paid in 2023; EUR 1.78/share paid in 2024; EUR 1.83/share paid in 2025

As stipulated in the 2020 Remuneration Policy for the Management Board, the employment contracts of the Management Board members define upper limits for the total remuneration of a financial year. These upper limits – hereinafter referred to as "salary caps" – are to be taken into account when determining the amount to be paid out for the LTI in that any exceeding of the upper limit leads to a reduction in the amount to be paid out for the LTI.

The salary cap for the 2023 financial year is to be applied when assessing the relevant maximum amounts for the payment of the LTI programme expiring in 2025. The cap is comprised of (i) the fixed basic salary 2023, (ii) the STI 2023 (paid in 2024) and (iii) the LTI 2023-2025 (paid in 2026).

The following table shows the maximum possible entitlements of the Management Board members. The amounts actually paid out for the LTI 2023-2025 are calculated on the basis of the "salary cap" upper limit. The LTI entitlements actually acquired therefore lie below the LTI model calculated value for all members of the Management Board participating in the LTI 2023-2025.

Long-Term Incentive 2023-2025 (entitlement)

EUR	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum	Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner ¹	Georg Pölzl ²
Upper limit "Salary Cap" 2023	1,832,000	1,551,000	-	2,865,000
Fixed basic salary 2023	520,000	470,000	-	700,000
STI 2023 ³	756,080	683,380	-	1,017,800
LTI 2023-2025 maximum possible entitlements	555,920	397,620	-	1,147,200
LTI 2023-2025 ENTITLEMENTS ACCORDING TO "SALARY CAP"⁴	555,920	397,620	-	1,147,200

¹ Member of the Management Board since 1 January 2025

² Retired as of 30 September 2024

³ Payment in 2024

⁴ Payment in 2026

3.4 Remuneration awarded from current LTI programmes

Since the introduction of the share-based remuneration programme in 2010, a new three-year LTI tranche begins each financial year. As at 31 December 2025, Walter Oblin and Peter Umundum participated in LTI tranches 14 (2023-2025),

15 (2024–2026) and 16 (2025–2027). As at the same date, Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner participated in LTI tranche 16 (2025–2027). Georg Pölzl participated in LTI tranches 14 (2023–2025) and 15 (2024–2026) as at 31 December 2025.

Tranche 15 (2024–2026) and tranche 16 (2025–2027) of the Long-Term Incentive are based on the new remuneration policy adopted by the Annual General Meeting on 18 April 2024. In line with this policy, three key performance measures were defined for each LTI programme, each contributing equally – one third each – to the overall target achievement. The financial metrics used in both tranches are Earnings per Share (EPS) and operating free cash flow. These two indicators represent the key measures of the company's profitability, efficiency and cash-generation capability, and guide the long-term financial alignment of the remuneration system.

The third component of each tranche is an ESG target, consisting of three specific sub-aspects: CO₂e reduction, the expansion of the self-service infrastructure, and the proportion of women in management positions. In tranche 15, these targets are assessed at the level of Austria; in tranche 16, the scope was expanded to include the entire Group.

Through this structured design, both LTI tranches combine financial steering metrics with clearly measurable sustainability objectives. They therefore support both the company's long-term strategic direction and its sustainable transformation.

The number of Performance Share Units at a target achievement level of 100% (calculated value) assigned to the individual tranches as at 31 December 2025 is as follows:

Bonus shares

Number of shares	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum	Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner ¹	Georg Pölzl ²
Tranche 14 (LTI 2023-2025)	14,473	11,991	-	28,413
Tranche 15 (LTI 2024-2026)	19,733	15,888	-	20,436
Tranche 16 (LTI 2025-2027)	21,421	17,247	11,728	-

¹ Member of the Management Board since 1 January 2025

² Retired as of 30 September 2024

As already explained, the performance share units can be paid out in the form of Österreichische Post shares or in cash. The decision on the form of payment is at the discretion of the Supervisory Board's Remuneration Committee. According to past business practice, payment in cash is to be expected, which is why cash-settled share-based payments are accounted for.

For the expected cash payments, provisions are allocated for the expected future total costs of all existing and ongoing LTI programmes at the balance sheet date based on fair values.

Carrying amount of provisions

EUR	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum	Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner ¹	Georg Pölzl ²
Tranche 14 (LTI 2023-2025)	555,920	397,620	-	1,147,200
Tranche 15 (LTI 2024-2026)	803,948	562,316	-	1,248,887
Tranche 16 (LTI 2025-2027)	358,090	288,317	196,056	-

¹ Member of the Management Board since 1 January 2025

² Retired as of 30 September 2024

The total costs reported for the share-based remuneration of the Management Board members in the 2025 financial year is assigned to the individual tranches as follows:

Total cost

EUR	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum	Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner ¹	Georg Pölzl ²
Tranche 14 (LTI 2023-2025)	210,720	153,644	-	61,961
Tranche 15 (LTI 2024-2026)	433,189	288,087	-	96,983
Tranche 16 (LTI 2025-2027)	358,090	288,317	196,056	-

¹ Member of the Management Board since 1 January 2025


² Retired as of 30 September 2024

3.5 Overview of the total remuneration of the Management Board


The following explanations and tables provide an overall overview of the remuneration of the Management Board. The entitlements arising in the 2025 financial year for the active and former members of the Management Board of Österreichische Post amount to approximately EUR 4.6m (2024: EUR 5.9m).

Overall, total remuneration of the Management Board decreased by around EUR 1.3m (-21.6%) in the 2025 financial year compared with the previous year. This change is clearly reflected in the structure of the remuneration components. The sharpest decline relates to the Short-Term Incentive (STI), which decreased from EUR 2.180m in 2024 to EUR 0.902m in 2025. This was mainly due to the elimination of a substantial portion of the STI as a result of personnel changes within the Management Board, as well as the reduction in the proportion of short-term variable remuneration components anchored in the 2024 remuneration policy. In addition, the lower STI target achievement compared with the previous year further reduced the bonus amounts relevant for payment. Fixed remuneration decreased moderately during the reporting year from EUR 1.761m to EUR 1.636m, primarily reflecting the mid-year changes in the composition of the Management Board. Long-term variable remuneration (LTI), by contrast, remained almost at the previous year's level at EUR 2.101m (previous year: EUR 1.977m).

Total remuneration (EUR k)




Variable remuneration (EUR k)



Overall, the remuneration structure for 2025 shows a clear shift in favour of long-term elements, while the proportion of short-term remuneration components has declined significantly in line with the new remuneration policy.

Distribution of remuneration components (%)



In summary, the following table shows the total entitlements acquired by the Management Board in 2025¹. In addition to the remuneration of the individual Management Board members, the relative share of fixed and variable remuneration components is also shown.

Total remuneration 2025

EUR	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum	Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner ¹	Georg Pölzl ²	Total
Fixed remuneration 2025	686,716	568,174	381,161	-	1,636,052
Variable remuneration					
STI 2025 ³	382,826	308,850	209,907	-	901,583
LTI 2023-2025 ³	555,920	397,620	-	1,147,200	2,100,740
Total variable remuneration	938,746	706,470	209,907	1,147,200	3,002,322
TOTAL	1,625,462	1,274,644	591,068	1,147,200	4,638,374
Relative share of fixed remuneration (%)	42.2	44.6	64.5	0.0	
Relative share of variable remuneration (%)					
STI 2025	23.6	24.2	35.5	0.0	
LTI 2023-2025	34.2	31.2	0.0	100.0	

¹ Member of the Management Board since 1 January 2025

² Retired as of 30 September 2024

³ Payment in 2026

In comparison, the table below shows the total acquired entitlements of the Management Board in 2024, of which the fixed basic salary was paid out in 2024 and the variable components in 2025.

¹ The presentation differs from the mandatory disclosures in the notes in accordance with the Austrian Commercial Code (UGB) and IFRS (remuneration to active and former members of the Management Board) due to different disclosure requirements and is therefore only comparable to a limited extent.

Total remuneration 2024

EUR	Walter Oblin	Peter Umundum	Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner ¹	Georg Pözl ²	Total
Fixed remuneration 2024	618,549	544,761	0	597,281	1,760,592
Variable remuneration					
STI 2024 ³	740,033	653,721	0	786,066	2,179,820
LTI 2022-2024 ³	514,332	417,877	0	1,044,819	1,977,028
Total variable remuneration	1,254,365	1,071,598	0	1,830,885	4,156,848
TOTAL	1,872,914	1,616,360	0	2,428,166	5,917,440

¹ Member of the Management Board since 1 January 2025

² Retired as of 30 September 2024

³ Payment in 2025

Pursuant to Section 78c Austrian Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the annual change in total remuneration of the Management Board, the business success of the Company and the average salaries of other employees of the Company on a full-time equivalent basis should be illustrated in a comparative presentation.

EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation) and EBIT (earnings before interest and tax) are the most important key figures used by Österreichische Post to measure its operating success. Expressed as a percentage of revenue, they illustrate the profitability of revenue and show how successfully the operating business is being managed. EBITDA decreased by 2.2% compared to the previous year to EUR 413.3m. EBIT 2025 of EUR 196.9m decreased by 5.0% compared to the previous year.

As a comparative figure for the salaries earned by other employees, the salaries/wages and bonuses for employees of Österreichische Post AG who were continuously employed throughout the financial year and in the comparative periods are used on a full-time equivalent basis.

Annual change

Total	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Change (%)		vs 2021	vs 2022	vs 2023	vs 2024
Total remuneration (EUR)					
Walter Oblin	1,794,892	1,879,730	1,812,058	1,872,914	1,625,462
		4.7%	-3.6%	3.4%	-13.2%
Peter Umundum	1,573,007	1,630,381	1,589,257	1,616,360	1,274,644
		3.6%	-2.5%	1.7%	-21.1%
Barbara Potisk-Eibensteiner ¹	-	-	-	-	591,068
					n.a.
Total active Management Board (2025)					3,491,174
					n.a.
Georg Pölzl ²	2,809,388	2,910,117	2,824,257	2,428,166	1,147,200
		3.6%	-3.0%	-14.0%	-52.8%
Total active and former Management Board	6,177,287	6,420,228	6,225,572	5,917,440	4,638,374
		3.9%	-3.0%	-4.9%	-21.6%
Economic performance indicators (EUR m)					
Revenue	2,520	2,522	2,741	3,123	3,043
		0.1%	8.7%	13.9%	-2.6%
EBITDA	370	373	392	423	413
		0.6%	5.0%	8.0%	-2.2%
EBIT	205	188	190	207	197
		-8.0%	1.0%	9.0%	-5.0%
Remuneration paid to other employees on a full-time equivalent basis (EUR)					
Civil servants	55,359	58,221	61,661	67,438	70,820
		5.2%	5.9%	9.4%	5.0%
Salaried employees – General Service Regulation/Special contract	47,897	50,704	53,905	58,984	61,493
		5.9%	6.3%	9.4%	4.3%
Salaried employees - New collective labour agreement	38,971	41,721	44,743	48,391	50,038
		7.1%	7.2%	8.2%	3.4%

¹ Member of the Management Board since 1 January 2025

² Retired as of 30 September 2024

3.6 Payments to former members of the Management Board

Georg Pölzl stepped down from Austrian Post's Management Board as planned on 30 September 2024 after his contract expired and took his retirement.

In 2025, Georg Pölzl earned an entitlement under the Long-Term Incentive 2023–2025, which will be paid out in 2026 following the determination of the target achievement. In addition, he was granted the entitlements acquired under the Short-Term Incentive 2024 and the Long-Term Incentive 2022–2024, both of which were paid out in 2025.

Remuneration 2025

EUR	Georg Pözl
Remuneration 2025	
LTI 2023-2025	1,147,200
SUMME	1,147,200

For the Long-Term Incentive programmes ongoing in the 2025 financial year in which Georg Pözl participated, the following provisions were recognised.

Provisions 2025

	Georg Pözl
Bonus shares (number of shares)	
Tranche 14 (2023-2025)	28,413
Tranche 15 (2024-2026)	20,436
Carrying amount of provisions (EUR)	
Tranche 14 (2023-2025)	1,147,200
Tranche 15 (2024-2026)	1,248,887
Total cost (EUR)	
Tranche 14 (2023-2025)	61,961
Tranche 15 (2024-2026)	96,983

4. Remuneration of the Supervisory Board 2025

The Remuneration Policy for the Supervisory Board of Österreichische Post stipulates a fixed remuneration that is independent of performance. Variable remuneration components are not provided for. The remuneration for Supervisory Board members consists of an annual basic remuneration and a committee remuneration as well as attendance fees paid for each Supervisory Board meeting attended. Furthermore, every Supervisory Board member is entitled to be reimbursed for appropriate cash expenditures, especially relevant travel costs. The remuneration system provides for different levels of remuneration, depending upon the individual's position as the Chair, Deputy Chair or member of the Supervisory Board.

The amount of remuneration paid to Supervisory Board members is resolved upon by the Annual General Meeting for the particular previous financial year. The Annual General Meeting held on 9 April 2025 specified the remuneration for the Supervisory Board members for the 2024 financial year as follows:

Remuneration of the Supervisory Board

EUR	
Chair	36,000
Deputy Chair	30,000
For every other Supervisory Board member	24,000
Committee Chair	17,000
Deputy Chair of the Audit Committee	14,000
For every other committee member	12,000
Attendance fee	800
Attendance fee for international expert ¹	1,800

¹ For participation in meetings of the Supervisory Board in a form other than physical presence, the attendance fee shall in any case be EUR 800 per member and meeting.

Committee remuneration is limited to membership on one committee and is thus paid only once even if a member of the Supervisory Board belongs to several committees. If members of the Supervisory Board or a committee have not belonged to the body for the entire financial year, the remuneration shall be paid on a pro rata (daily) basis.

In the past financial year, the following change occurred in the composition of the Supervisory Board: At the Annual General Meeting on 9 April 2025, Peter E. Kruse stepped down from the Supervisory Board and Eric Malitzke was elected as a new member. Furthermore, the supervisory board mandates of Huberta Gheneff and Christiane Wenckheim were extended.

There was also a change on the part of the employee representatives: Veronika Schmidt was delegated to the Supervisory Board with effect from 18 September 2025, succeeding Ulrike Ernstbrunner.

The shareholder representatives of the Supervisory Board hold the following positions on the committees:

- Nomination Committee: Elisabeth Stadler (Chair), Stefan Fürnsinn
- Remuneration Committee: Elisabeth Stadler (Chair), Stefan Fürnsinn, Christiane Wenckheim
- Audit Committee: Bernhard Spalt (Chair, financial expert), Stefan Fürnsinn (Deputy Chair), Huberta Gheneff, Maria Zesch
- Banking Committee: Bernhard Spalt (Chair), Felicia Kölliker

The average attendance rate at the plenary meetings was around 92%, and the committees were each fully attended. The employee representatives perform their duties on the Supervisory Board on an honorary basis and are compensated for their involvement in the Central Works Council in accordance with their respective employment contracts. They are entitled to reimbursement of expenses, which can also be granted as a lump sum. This results in the following entitlements for the shareholder representatives on the Supervisory Board for their work in the 2025 financial year.

Remuneration of the Supervisory Board in 2025

EUR

Name	Basic remuneration ¹	Committee remuneration ¹	Attendance fees	Total
Elisabeth Stadler (Chair)	36,000	17,000	11,200	64,200
Stefan Fürnsinn (Deputy Chair) ²	30,000	14,000	14,400	58,400
Huberta Gheneff	24,000	12,000	8,800	44,800
Felicia Kölliker	24,000	12,000	15,200	51,200
Peter E. Kruse ³	6,510	3,255	4,400	14,164
Eric Malitzke ⁴	17,556	-	8,800	26,356
Bernhard Spalt	24,000	17,000	11,200	52,200
Christiane Wenckheim	24,000	8,778	5,600	38,378
María Zesch	24,000	8,778	8,000	40,778
TOTAL	210,066	92,811	87,600	390,477

¹ Payment in 2026, subject to the approval of the Annual General Meeting 2026

² Remuneration will be transferred to Österreichische Beteiligungs AG (ÖBAG)

³ Retired as of 9 April 2025 - therefore pro-rata share of remuneration

⁴ Since 9 April 2025 - therefore pro-rata share of remuneration

The following table shows the comparative values for the 2024 financial year.

Remuneration of the Supervisory Board in 2024

EUR

Name	Basic remuneration ¹	Committee remuneration ¹	Attendance fee	Total
Elisabeth Stadler (Chair)	36,000	17,000	12,800	65,800
Stefan Fürnsinn (Deputy Chair) ²	30,000	14,000	16,000	60,000
Huberta Gheneff	24,000	12,000	6,400	42,400
Felicia Kölliker	24,000	12,000	11,400	47,400
Peter E. Kruse	24,000	12,000	14,200	50,200
Bernhard Spalt	24,000	17,000	9,600	50,600
Sigrid Stagl ³	7,148	3,574	1,600	12,321
Christiane Wenckheim	24,000	-	3,200	27,200
María Zesch ⁴	16,918	-	2,400	19,318
TOTAL	210,066	87,574	77,600	375,239

¹ Payment in 2025

² Remuneration transferred to Österreichische Beteiligungs AG (ÖBAG)

³ Retired as of 18 April 2024 - therefore pro-rata share of remuneration

⁴ Since 18 April 2024 - therefore pro-rata share of remuneration

10 March 2026

Elisabeth Stadler m.p.
Chair of the Supervisory Board

Walter Oblin m.p.
Chair of the Management Board